Supreme Court: NCLAT Cannot Use Section 4 of the Limitation Act to Admit an IBC Appeal Filed on the 46th Day
In Lulu International Shopping Malls Pvt. Ltd. v. Gorinka Pratyusha and others, 2026 INSC 1224, the Supreme Court held that the NCLAT, Chennai, acted illegally in entertaining two appeals against the approval of Lulu’s resolution plan for Manjeera Retail Holdings, because they were filed on the 46th day – one day beyond the outer limit of 30 + 15 days in Section 61(2) of the IBC. The NCLAT had stretched the deadline by treating the 45th day, a second Saturday, as a holiday under Section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Court also held that the NCLAT should have recalled that order once the binding ruling in Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee was pointed out.
Key Takeaways
- Section 61(2) of the IBC allows 30 days to appeal, plus a condonable 15 days – and no more.
- Section 4 of the Limitation Act (court closed on the last day) applies only to the ‘prescribed period’ of 30 days, not to the discretionary 15-day extension, as held in Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee, (2025) 9 SCC 483.
- The NCLAT has no power of review, but it does have inherent power under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 to recall its orders on sufficient grounds.
- A Supreme Court ruling declares the law as it always stood; an earlier contrary order is not saved unless it has attained finality.
- Recall applications kept the condonation issue alive, so the condonation order had not become final even though it was not separately appealed.
- Both appeals by the homebuyer-claimants were dismissed as time-barred, protecting Lulu’s approved plan, under which it claims to have invested ₹271.52 crore.
Case Details at a Glance
| Case title | Lulu International Shopping Malls Pvt. Ltd. v. Gorinka Pratyusha and others, etc. |
|---|---|
| Citation | 2026 INSC 1224 (Non-reportable) |
| Case number | Civil Appeal Nos. 3110–3111 of 2026 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction |
| Bench | Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva |
| Authored by | Justice Sanjay Kumar |
| Date of judgment | 16 November 2026 |
| Provisions | Sections 61(2) and 62, IBC; Section 4, Limitation Act, 1963; Rule 11, NCLAT Rules, 2016 |
| Impugned order | NCLAT, Chennai, common order dated 10.02.2026 dismissing recall applications in Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025 |
| Corporate debtor | Manjeera Retail Holdings Private Limited |
| Result | Appeals allowed; condonation of delay set aside; NCLAT appeals dismissed as time-barred |
Background of the Dispute
The NCLT, Hyderabad Bench, admitted Manjeera Retail Holdings Private Limited into the corporate insolvency resolution process on 18.07.2023 in CP (IB) No. 296/7/HDB/2022. Lulu International Shopping Malls Pvt. Ltd. emerged as the successful resolution applicant after its plan received 100% approval from the Committee of Creditors. The NCLT approved the plan on 26.03.2025, and Lulu says it has since invested ₹271.52 crore in implementing it.
Three persons – Gorinka Pratyusha, Srinivas Kalluri and Rajani Kalluri – claimed to have agreed to buy commercial units in Manjeera Mall. They challenged the plan approval before the NCLAT, complaining that the Resolution Professional had recorded their full sale consideration as ‘advances from customers’ rather than admitting them as financial creditors, despite NCLT orders directing inclusion of their claims in the Information Memorandum.
The problem was timing. Under Section 61(2), the 30-day period expired on 25.04.2025 and the extra 15 days on 10.05.2025. Both appeals were filed on 11.05.2025 – the 46th day.
Timeline of Events
- 18.07.2023NCLT admits Manjeera Retail Holdings into CIRP.
- 26.03.2025NCLT approves Lulu’s resolution plan.
- 25.04.202530-day appeal period under Section 61(2) expires.
- 07.05.2025Supreme Court decides Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee.
- 10.05.2025Outer 15-day period expires (a second Saturday).
- 11.05.2025Appeals e-filed (a Sunday) – the 46th day.
- 10.10.2025NCLAT condones the delay applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act.
- 10.02.2026NCLAT dismisses Lulu’s recall applications.
- 16.03.2026Supreme Court stays the NCLAT proceedings.
- 16.11.2026Supreme Court allows Lulu’s appeals.
What the NCLAT Did
On 10.10.2025, the NCLAT condoned the delay. It reasoned that because 10.05.2025 (the 45th day) was a second Saturday, Section 4 of the Limitation Act carried the deadline over to the next working day.
Lulu applied for recall, relying on Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee, (2025) 9 SCC 483. On 10.02.2026, the NCLAT condoned Lulu’s own three-day delay in filing the recall applications but dismissed them. It said its earlier order was passed on merits, that a precedent cited after the order could not justify recall, and that Lulu should pursue its other remedies.
Supreme Court’s Ruling
1. The precedent was not ‘subsequent’
The Court pointed out a basic factual error: Tata Steel was decided on 07.05.2025, five months before the NCLAT’s condonation order of 10.10.2025. In any case, when the Supreme Court clarifies a statutory provision, that becomes the law of the land, and an earlier contrary order is not saved unless it has attained finality.
2. Section 4 does not reach the discretionary 15 days
Under Tata Steel, ‘prescribed period’ in Section 4 means only the period of limitation. The further period during which a tribunal may allow filing in its discretion is not part of it. So the holiday benefit is available only if the 30-day period ends on a closed day – not when the 45th day does.
3. The NCLAT does have power to recall
The NCLAT has no review power under the IBC, but it can recall its orders under its inherent jurisdiction preserved by Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016. The Court relied on the 5-Judge NCLAT decision in Union Bank of India v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian, affirmed in Union Bank of India v. Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd., and on Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni. The NCLAT was therefore wrong to refuse recall once the settled legal position was shown to it.
4. No sufficient cause anyway
The appeals were e-filed on 11.05.2025, itself a Sunday. If e-filing was possible on a Sunday, it was equally possible on Saturday 10.05.2025. The holiday was no real obstacle.
5. The ‘finality’ objection rejected
The respondents argued that the condonation order of 10.10.2025 was never separately challenged and had become final. The Court called this a ‘specious argument’: the recall applications kept the issue alive, and the refusal to recall was properly before the Court under Section 62 of the IBC.
“...entertainment of the appeals by the NCLAT was illegal, as the appeals were filed beyond the time prescribed in Section 61(2) of the IBC.” – Supreme Court, 2026 INSC 1224, para 14
Final directions
- The NCLAT order dated 10.02.2026 dismissing the recall applications is set aside and the recall applications are allowed.
- The NCLAT order dated 10.10.2025 condoning delay is set aside.
- Company Appeal (AT)(CH)(Ins) Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025 stand dismissed on the ground of limitation. No costs.
Analysis: Why This Matters
The IBC is built around speed, and Section 61(2) is one of its firmest deadlines. This ruling applies Tata Steel strictly: the 15-day window is itself a concession, and it cannot be further stretched by holidays. Counsel calculating limitation for an IBC appeal should treat day 45 as an absolute outer limit, whatever day of the week it falls on.
The judgment is equally useful on procedure. A party that loses a condonation decision need not always file a separate appeal at once; a timely recall application before the NCLAT can keep the issue open, and the refusal to recall can then be taken to the Supreme Court under Section 62. The Court also confirmed that ‘no review’ does not mean ‘no recall’ – a point that is often argued before the NCLAT.
This decision was delivered on the same day, by the same Bench, as the ruling in the connected Manjeera Constructions matter, where the Court set aside an NCLAT order for not hearing the successful resolution applicant. Together, the two judgments give strong protection to resolution applicants who have already started implementing an approved plan.
Practical Lessons
For appellants before the NCLAT
- Count 30 days from the date of the order (or, where relevant, knowledge of it); file within that period wherever possible.
- If you need the extra 15 days, file before day 45 ends. A holiday on day 45 will not save you; e-filing is open on holidays.
- Show genuine ‘sufficient cause’ for any delay; a bare reference to a holiday is not enough.
For successful resolution applicants and respondents
- Check the filing date of every appeal against plan approval and object to limitation at the first hearing.
- If delay is wrongly condoned, consider a prompt recall application citing the binding precedent, and then an appeal under Section 62.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the limitation period for an appeal to the NCLAT under Section 61(2) of the IBC?
Thirty days from the order, with a further period of up to 15 days that the NCLAT may allow if sufficient cause is shown. No appeal can be entertained after the 45th day.
Does Section 4 of the Limitation Act apply if the 45th day is a holiday?
No. Following Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee, the Supreme Court in 2026 INSC 1224 held that Section 4 applies only to the prescribed 30-day period and not to the discretionary 15-day extension.
Can the NCLAT recall its own order?
Yes. Although the NCLAT has no power of review, it can recall an order on sufficient grounds in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016.
Was the condonation order final because it was not separately challenged?
No. The Supreme Court held that the recall applications kept the issue alive, so the condonation order had not attained finality and could be corrected under Section 62 of the IBC.
What happened to the homebuyers’ claims?
Their appeals were dismissed as time-barred. The Supreme Court did not decide whether they were financial creditors; it decided only the limitation question.
This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should refer to the certified copy of the judgment and consult a qualified professional before acting. See our Editorial Policy and Disclaimer.
