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Electricity Law · Review

Tribunal ‘Innovating at Pleasure’: Supreme Court Sets Aside APTEL Review Allowed After Five Years Against Binding Precedent on DVC Sinking Fund, Imposes Costs

In Damodar Valley Corporation v. Maithan Alloys Limited, 2026 INSC 1178, the Supreme Court set aside a 2024 order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity that, on a review petition pending for five years, reopened its own 2019 decision on DVC’s 2009 to 2014 tariff. APTEL held in review that allowing both depreciation on bond-funded assets and contributions to the sinking fund for redeeming those bonds was a ‘double benefit’, and that this point had escaped even the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys v. DVC (2018). The Supreme Court held that the issue had in fact been decided under Section 40 of the DVC Act, that review cannot correct a supposed error requiring long reasoning, and that the order breached judicial discipline and Article 141. It restored the 2019 order, imposed Rs 2 lakh costs on the review petitioner and Rs 1.5 lakh on SAIL for supporting the review.

Key Takeaways

  • A tribunal cannot, in review, disregard a binding Supreme Court decision on the very issue; doing so breaches Article 141 and judicial discipline.
  • Review is limited to an error apparent on the face of the record; an error discovered by long reasoning, or a different possible view, is not a ground (Kamal Sengupta).
  • A review cannot be used as a disguised appeal; if a Supreme Court decision is thought wrong, the remedy lies before the Supreme Court.
  • Under Section 40 of the DVC Act and the tariff regulations, DVC’s contribution to the sinking fund for redeeming bonds can be recovered in tariff alongside depreciation.
  • Sitting on a review for five years without appealing was an abuse of process, attracting costs.
  • A public sector undertaking that intervened to support an order in breach of precedent was also visited with costs.

Case Details at a Glance

Case titleDamodar Valley Corporation v. Maithan Alloys Limited & Ors.
Citation2026 INSC 1178 (Reportable)
BenchJustice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran
Authored byJustice K. Vinod Chandran
Date of judgment30 October 2026
Tariff period2009 to 2014
PrecedentBhaskar Shrachi Alloys Ltd. v. Damodar Valley Corporation, (2018) 8 SCC 281
ResultAPTEL review order set aside; 17.05.2019 order restored; costs of Rs 2 lakh and Rs 1.5 lakh

Facts of the Case

DVC, a statutory corporation responsible for power generation, flood control and irrigation, had its tariff for 2009 to 2014 fixed by CERC, including contributions to a sinking fund for redeeming its bonds. In Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys (2018), the Supreme Court had upheld factoring the sinking fund in DVC’s tariff for an earlier period. Relying on that decision and its own reasoning, APTEL upheld the CERC order on 17 May 2019.

No one appealed. Maithan Alloys filed a review, which remained pending for five years. In 2024 APTEL allowed it, holding that allowing both depreciation and sinking fund was double benefit, a point it said had escaped both itself and the Supreme Court, and permitted DVC only one of the two. DVC appealed; SAIL intervened in support of the review.

Timeline of Proceedings

  • 2018Supreme Court decides Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys v. DVC.
  • 17.05.2019APTEL upholds CERC tariff for 2009 to 2014.
  • 2019 to 2024Review petition pending.
  • 2024APTEL allows review and disallows double benefit.
  • 30.10.2026Supreme Court sets aside the review order with costs.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

  1. Could APTEL, in review, depart from its earlier order based on a binding Supreme Court decision?
  2. Was the sinking fund properly factored in DVC’s tariff along with depreciation?

Supreme Court’s Ruling

1. The issue was already decided

Examining Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys, the Court found it had upheld both depreciation and the sinking fund as items recoverable through tariff under Section 40 of the DVC Act, even if the words ‘double allowance’ were not used. APTEL’s 2019 order had also dealt with the double allowance argument.

2. Review overstepped its limits

Applying the principles in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta, an error requiring long reasoning is not an error apparent; an erroneous order cannot be corrected in review; and a review cannot sit in appeal. APTEL’s order fell within none of the permissible grounds.

3. Article 141 and judicial discipline

The Court said the Tribunal had ‘gone haywire’. Article 141 ensures Supreme Court decisions are followed, failing which there would be mayhem; finality and closure are essential in litigation.

“The impugned order was passed in a petition seeking review of an order of the year 2019, which was allowed in 2024, after more than five years.” – Supreme Court, 2026 INSC 1178, para 1

Result

The review order was set aside and APTEL’s order of 17 May 2019 restored. Costs of Rs 2,00,000 were imposed on Maithan Alloys for abuse of process and Rs 1,50,000 on SAIL, payable to DVC within a month, failing which 18% interest applies. The appeal was allowed with costs.

Analysis and Practical Points

The judgment is a sharp reminder to tribunals and litigants about the limited scope of review and the binding force of Supreme Court decisions.

  • Consumers challenging tariffs: if you disagree with a decision applying Supreme Court precedent, appeal; do not file and sit on a review.
  • Tribunals: cannot re-examine issues settled by the Supreme Court, even if they think an argument was not considered.
  • DVC: sinking fund contributions and depreciation remain recoverable in tariff for 2009 to 2014.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can a tribunal review its order to depart from a Supreme Court decision?

No. In 2026 INSC 1178 the Supreme Court held this breaches Article 141 and judicial discipline, and set aside APTEL's review order with costs.

What is an error apparent on the face of the record?

An error evident from the record without long reasoning. A different possible view or an error discovered by detailed argument is not a ground for review.

Can DVC recover sinking fund contributions through tariff?

Yes. The Court held that under Section 40 of the DVC Act and the tariff regulations, sinking fund contributions and depreciation are both recoverable.

Why were costs imposed on SAIL?

Because it intervened to support an order passed in breach of judicial discipline and Article 141.

This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should refer to the certified copy of the judgment and consult a qualified professional before acting. See our Editorial Policy and Disclaimer.