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Arbitration · Section 37

Arbitrators Cannot Supplant Contract Terms With Their Own Fancies: Supreme Court Upholds Setting Aside of Specific Performance Award, Orders Refund With 9% Interest

In Shreeram Builders v. Upendra Kantilal Thanawala, 2026 INSC 1176, Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva upheld the Bombay High Court’s Section 37 judgment setting aside a 2011 majority arbitral award that had granted a developer specific performance of a 2003 development agreement for land in Thane. The majority had fixed a consideration of about Rs 10.91 crore at a rate six times the agreed rate without computation, included part of a bungalow and garden expressly excluded from the agreement (affecting co-owners who were not parties), relied on payments under a superseded MoU, and awarded damages the contract did not provide for. That violated Section 28(3) of the Arbitration Act. But since the owners had themselves failed to refund the consideration as Clause 54 required on termination, the Court invoked Article 142 to direct refund with 9% simple interest from each payment date.

Key Takeaways

  • An arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the contract terms (Section 28(3)); substituting new terms is a ground for setting aside.
  • Fixing a price six times the agreed rate without computation or reasons is beyond the scope of the agreement.
  • An award cannot deal with property expressly excluded from the agreement or affect the shares of non-parties.
  • An entire agreement clause bars reliance on payments under a superseded MoU.
  • Damages not provided for in the contract, especially as an alternative to specific performance, are opposed to public policy.
  • The Supreme Court may use Article 142 to grant refund with interest instead of relegating parties to fresh litigation.

Case Details at a Glance

Case titleShreeram Builders v. Upendra Kantilal Thanawala & Ors.
Citation2026 INSC 1176 (Reportable)
Case numberCivil Appeal Nos. 9817-9818 of 2024
BenchJustice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva
Authored byJustice Sanjay Kumar
Date of judgment29 October 2026
AgreementAgreement for Development dated 06.08.2003; terminated 09.04.2008
Impugned judgmentBombay High Court, 05.03.2024 under Section 37
ResultAward stays set aside; refund with 9% simple interest under Article 142

Facts of the Case

The respondents, co-owners of a 2/9th share in land in Thane, signed a development agreement in 2003 with the appellant firm. They terminated it in 2008 for default in payment. A three-member tribunal by majority held the termination illegal and granted specific performance on deposit of about Rs 10.91 crore; the dissenting arbitrator dismissed the claim.

The District Judge, Thane, upheld the award under Section 34 in a second round. The Bombay High Court allowed the owners’ Section 37 appeal and set aside the award, holding it rewrote the contract.

Timeline of Proceedings

  • 06.08.2003Agreement for Development signed.
  • 09.04.2008Owners terminate the agreement.
  • 10.12.2011Majority award grants specific performance.
  • 25.01.2020District Judge, Thane, upholds award.
  • 05.03.2024Bombay High Court sets aside award under Section 37.
  • 29.10.2026Supreme Court upholds set-aside, orders refund with interest.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

  1. Did the majority award rewrite the contract in breach of Section 28(3)?
  2. What relief should follow when the owners terminated but retained the consideration?

Supreme Court’s Ruling

1. Award rewrote the contract

The agreement fixed rates of Rs 915 and Rs 450 per square foot for specified FSI. The majority adopted Rs 5,490 per square foot without computation or reasons. It included the bungalow, garden and a chawl room that were excluded in their entirety, affecting the 7/9th co-owners who were not before the tribunal.

2. Superseded MoU and damages

Clause 51 superseded the earlier MoU, so payments under it could not be adjusted. The agreement did not provide for damages; awarding them as an alternative to specific performance was opposed to public policy.

3. Owners must refund

Under Clauses 53 and 54, on termination the owners were bound to return the consideration without interest. Having retained it since 2008, they were directed under Article 142 to refund it with 9% simple interest.

“The two learned arbitrators not only construed the express terms of the agreement contrarily but completely supplanted them with new terms, as per their own fancies.” – Supreme Court, 2026 INSC 1176, para 61

Result

The High Court’s setting aside of the award was upheld. The respondents must refund amounts paid under the agreement with 9% simple interest from each payment until refund, and the appellant’s deposits in court are to be returned with accrued interest. No costs.

Analysis and Practical Points

The ruling marks the outer limit of arbitral autonomy: interpretation is the tribunal’s domain, but rewriting price terms and property scope is not.

  • Developers: specific performance awards built on figures outside the agreement are vulnerable even after Section 34 affirmation.
  • Landowners: on termination, refund obligations under the contract must be honoured; retention invites interest.
  • Drafting: clearly define excluded property, rates and the effect of termination.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can an arbitral tribunal rewrite contract terms?

No. In 2026 INSC 1176 the Supreme Court upheld the setting aside of an award that adopted a new price and included excluded property, violating Section 28(3).

Can a Section 37 court set aside an award affirmed under Section 34?

Yes, where the award is vitiated by grounds such as rewriting the contract or conflict with public policy.

Can damages be awarded if the contract does not provide for them?

The Court held awarding damages not contemplated by the agreement, as an alternative to specific performance, was without foundation and opposed to public policy.

What did the developer get?

Refund of amounts paid with 9% simple interest from each payment date, under Article 142.

This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should refer to the certified copy of the judgment and consult a qualified professional before acting. See our Editorial Policy and Disclaimer.