Prosecutrix’s Evidence Cannot Be Disbelieved for Abduction and Believed for Rape: Supreme Court Acquits Ludhiana Man After 17 Years
In Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab, 2026 INSC 1054, the Supreme Court set aside a 10-year rape sentence. The trial court had acquitted the accused of abduction under Section 366 IPC because the prosecutrix went with him willingly for several days. On the same evidence it convicted him of rape under Section 376. The Supreme Court held that a prosecutrix’s evidence must be accepted or rejected as a whole; it cannot be partly rejected and partly accepted. It also criticised the trial judge’s reasoning, including the remark about “daring women”, and said that immoral conduct is not a ground for conviction without credible evidence.
Key Takeaways
- A rape conviction can rest on the prosecutrix’s testimony alone, but only if that testimony inspires confidence.
- If her evidence is disbelieved on abduction, the same evidence cannot be relied on to convict for rape where the two charges are intertwined.
- She travelled through busy, well-lit streets by car and scooter, and later by train, without raising any alarm. Her account of the return journey was contradictory.
- The presence of spermatozoa alone does not prove rape when the surrounding circumstances point to consent.
- The trial court found the prosecution had not proved she was a minor. An ossification test put her age at 17 to 19, and the court took it as 19.
- A conviction must rest on hard evidence, not on a judge’s own value judgments or on the immorality of the act.
Case Details at a Glance
| Case title | Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab |
|---|---|
| Citation | 2026 INSC 1054 (Reportable) |
| Case number | Criminal Appeal No. 203 of 2015 |
| Bench | Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar |
| Authored by | Justice Ujjal Bhuyan |
| Date of judgment | 25 September 2026 |
| Impugned judgment | Punjab and Haryana High Court, 12 September 2013, affirming Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, 1 June 2012 |
| Advocates who argued | For the appellant: Mr. Rajiv Kataria, Advocate For the State of Punjab: Ms. Nupur Kumar, Advocate |
| Result | Conviction and 10-year sentence under Section 376 IPC set aside |
Prosecution Case
According to the prosecution, on 19 June 2009 the prosecutrix, a Class VIII student, went out to buy groceries. The appellant offered to take her to meet his daughter, who was her friend, and drove her to flats in Ludhiana where he kept her for two days. He then took her by scooter to an abandoned factory in Malerkotla. She alleged rape at both places and threats. On 25 June 2009 the two returned to Ludhiana, where her father and the police intercepted them. The charge sheet was under Sections 366 and 376 IPC.
Trial Court and High Court
The Sessions Judge held that the date of birth claimed by the prosecution (13 March 1994) was not proved. An ossification test put her age at 17 to 19 and the court took it as 19, so kidnapping failed. On abduction, the court found she had gone with the appellant willingly. He was acquitted under Section 366. The same judge nevertheless convicted him of rape, reasoning that a woman may travel with a man and spend a night with him without consenting to sex, and adding the remark that “some daring women” do so. The High Court upheld the conviction, relying on the presumption against consent under Section 114A of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court released him on bail in January 2015, after almost six years in custody.
Why the Testimony Failed
- She went by car through crowded, brightly lit bazaars and by scooter from Ludhiana to Malerkotla, and never raised an alarm or got off to escape.
- She said in chief that they returned by car and in cross-examination that they took a train without tickets. Either way, she raised no alarm.
- Her claim that she shouted for help at Malerkotla did not fit her silence throughout the journeys.
- She was away from home for five or six days, travelling with the appellant of her own will.
The Court accepted that the trial judge’s general point, that travelling with a man does not mean consent to sex, may be true, and called the word “daring” wholly uncalled for. On these facts, however, the evidence did not show forcible intercourse. The trial court could not reject the prosecution version for Section 366 and accept the same version for Section 376. The appellant’s conduct may have been immoral and unethical, but without credible evidence that could not justify a conviction.
Final Decision
Appeal allowed. The Sessions Court judgment of 1 June 2012 and the High Court judgment of 12 September 2013 are set aside, and the appellant is cleared of the charge under Section 376 IPC.
Analysis and Practical Points
- Appreciating evidence: where charges arise from one narrative, courts must test the prosecutrix’s evidence consistently across all charges.
- Section 114A: the presumption that there was no consent applies once intercourse is proved, but it cannot rescue testimony that is unreliable overall.
- Age evidence: when documents fail and only an ossification range is available, courts generally read the age in the accused’s favour. That changes whether consent matters.
- Judicial language: remarks based on stereotypes in judgments will be disapproved.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a person be convicted of rape on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix?
Yes, but only if her testimony inspires confidence. Testimony full of contradictions cannot support a conviction.
Can a court accept part of a prosecutrix’s testimony and reject part?
The Court held that where her evidence was disbelieved on abduction, the same evidence could not be accepted to convict for rape on intertwined facts.
Why was age important in this case?
The prosecution failed to prove she was a minor, and the ossification test put her age at 17 to 19. As an adult, her consent was relevant.
What did the Court say about the trial judge’s remark?
It said the word “daring” prefixed to women was totally uncalled for, and that convictions must rest on evidence, not value judgments.
This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should refer to the certified copy of the judgment and consult a qualified professional before acting. See our Editorial Policy and Disclaimer.
