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Criminal Law · Evidence

Supreme Court Acquits Life Convict in Double Murder: Police Statements of Hostile Witnesses and a Hearsay FIR Cannot Be Used as Evidence

In Naresh v. State of Haryana, 2026 INSC 1220, the Supreme Court acquitted a man sentenced to death by the trial court (commuted to life by the High Court) for the 2011 murders of two widows in village Ranila, Bhiwani. Every private witness turned hostile. The Court held that the courts below wrongly used the witnesses’ police statements under Section 161 CrPC and a hearsay FIR as substantive evidence of involvement and motive, contrary to Section 162 CrPC; that the disclosure statements were not proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act; that the weapon story changed after the post-mortem; and that, once inadmissible material was excluded, the evidence against him was the same as against the co-accused whom the High Court had acquitted.

Key Takeaways

  • Statements to police under Section 161 CrPC cannot be used ‘for any purpose’ except to contradict the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act (Section 162 CrPC; Tahsildar Singh).
  • An FIR recording only hearsay, not supported by its maker in court, is not substantive evidence of guilt or motive.
  • A disclosure under Section 27 must be proved by narrating the accused’s actual words in evidence; a recovery proves at most knowledge of the place.
  • A recovery that bears no connection with the fatal injuries, or a weapon ‘discovered’ only after the post-mortem changed the theory, is not incriminating.
  • A doctor’s opinion that a weapon ‘could have’ caused injuries and inconclusive serology do not connect the accused with the crime.
  • Parity: where the evidence against two accused is of the same kind and quality, one cannot be convicted and the other acquitted.
  • The Court recommended victim compensation for the families under Section 357A(3) CrPC (now Section 396 BNSS).

Case Details at a Glance

Case titleNaresh v. State of Haryana
Citation2026 INSC 1220 (Reportable)
Case numberCriminal Appeal Nos. 1137–1138 of 2014
BenchJustice Satish Chandra Sharma and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Authored byJustice Satish Chandra Sharma
Date of judgment16 November 2026
OffencesSections 302, 449, 297 and 201 IPC
Impugned orderPunjab and Haryana High Court judgment dated 08.10.2013 in Murder Reference No. 02 of 2013 and CRA No. D-205-DB of 2013
Trial courtSessions Case No. 64 of 2011, Bhiwani – death sentence (20/28.02.2013)
ResultAppeals allowed; appellant acquitted of all charges

Facts of the Case

On the night of 17.04.2011, two widows, Suman (about 35) and Shakuntla (about 40), were found dead in their houses near the Post Office chowk of village Ranila, District Bhiwani. Shakuntla was the widow of the appellant’s paternal uncle. The FIR, lodged by a village panch who had not seen the occurrence, said he ‘came to know later’ that the appellant killed them with a danda because he believed they were involved in immoral activity. It did not name the source.

The appellant and a co-accused were arrested. The police recorded disclosure statements leading to clothes and a danda, and – after the post-mortem revealed incised wounds – further disclosures leading to a gandasi (from the appellant) and an axe (from the co-accused).

At trial, every private witness, including the deceased Suman’s son, turned hostile. The trial court still convicted both, relying on their earlier police statements, and sentenced them to death. The High Court acquitted the co-accused but upheld the appellant’s conviction, commuting death to life imprisonment, mainly because he was named in the FIR and in the police statements.

Questions Framed by the Supreme Court

  1. Could the FIR and Section 161 statements be used to prove involvement and motive when every private witness turned hostile?
  2. Were the disclosures and recoveries proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, and were they incriminating?
  3. Did the medical and forensic evidence connect the appellant to the deaths?
  4. Was there admissible evidence for the charges under Sections 449, 297 and 201 IPC?
  5. Could the appellant be convicted on the same kind of evidence on which the co-accused was acquitted?

Supreme Court’s Ruling

1. Section 162 CrPC bars use of police statements

Following the Constitution Bench in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. and V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, the Court held that a statement to police can be used only to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Here the statements were not even proved as contradictions. The trial court’s reasoning that the witnesses turned hostile because they were relatives or neighbours, and its reliance on Trimukh Maroti Kirkan and Ramesh Prasad Misra, could not justify using them as substantive evidence.

2. The FIR was hearsay

The informant admitted he did not witness the occurrence and did not support the FIR in court. Treating it as a binding document and the basis of motive was an error.

3. Disclosures not proved; recoveries not incriminating

The witnesses to the disclosures never narrated the appellant’s actual words, so Section 27 was not satisfied. The danda bore no connection with the incised wounds. The gandasi surfaced only after the post-mortem altered the theory, and the only independent attesting witness had his own infirmities.

4. Medical and forensic evidence inconclusive

The doctor said only that the gandasi could have caused the injuries – as could the axe recovered from the co-accused. The blood group was undetermined throughout. None of the five ‘golden principles’ for circumstantial evidence (the ‘panchsheel’ of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda) was satisfied.

5. Other charges and parity

There was no admissible evidence of house-trespass, of the bodies being dragged, or of who moved them. And once the FIR and police statements were excluded, the evidence against the appellant was the same as against the acquitted co-accused. Applying Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, like cases must be decided alike.

“The gaps so created were filled by the courts below with statements which the law does not permit to be used as evidence.” – Supreme Court, 2026 INSC 1220, para 77

Result

Conviction and sentence set aside; acquittal on all charges; compensation under Section 357 CrPC set aside and fine to be refunded. Recognising the families’ loss, the Court recommended that DLSA Bhiwani consider victim compensation under Section 357A(3) CrPC (now Section 396 BNSS).

Analysis and Practical Points

The Court acknowledged that concurrent findings are rarely disturbed under Article 136, but held that interference is necessary where those findings rest on material the law forbids. This is a strong reaffirmation of Section 162 CrPC (now Section 181 BNSS) at a time when trial courts, faced with hostile witnesses, are often tempted to rely on what witnesses told the police.

  • Prosecutors: where witnesses are likely to turn hostile, consider recording statements before a Magistrate (Section 164 CrPC / Section 183 BNSS) and build independent corroboration.
  • Trial judges: use police statements only to contradict, after following Section 145 of the Evidence Act (now Section 148 BSA); do not use them to fill gaps.
  • Defence: insist that the actual words of any disclosure be proved; test whether the weapon theory changed after the post-mortem.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can a statement made to the police be used as evidence if the witness turns hostile?

No. Under Section 162 CrPC it can only be used to contradict the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. In 2026 INSC 1220 the Supreme Court set aside a murder conviction resting on such statements.

Is an FIR substantive evidence?

No. An FIR is not substantive evidence, and one that records hearsay and is not supported by its maker cannot prove involvement or motive.

How must a disclosure statement under Section 27 be proved?

The witness must narrate in evidence the actual words used by the accused leading to the discovery. A recovery proves at most that the accused knew where the object was.

What is the principle of parity among co-accused?

Where the evidence against two accused is of the same kind and quality, the court cannot convict one and acquit the other.

Will the victims’ families get compensation after the acquittal?

The Court recommended that the District Legal Services Authority, Bhiwani consider compensation under the victim compensation scheme, now under Section 396 BNSS.

This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should refer to the certified copy of the judgment and consult a qualified professional before acting. See our Editorial Policy and Disclaimer.