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Court Martial upheld Sanjay Marutirao Patil v UOI CA 2448 of 2010, Supreme Court Judgment dated 24.01.2020

A Bench of Judges of the Supreme Court, Justice L. Nageswar Rao and Justice M. R. Shah passed Judgment, in the case of Civil Appeal No. 2448 of 2020 in Sanjay Marutirao Patil v UOI dismissed the Appeal filed by the Petitioner.

Facts of the case is that the Appellant joined the Indian Army as a Sepoy on 30.08.1990. In the year 1994-95, he was promoted as Naik. Thereafter, he became qualified for promotion to the post of Hawaldar. He was served with a charge sheet dated 3.8.1999 levelling three charges of misconduct. That the three charges were framed against the appellant under Section 63 of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Army Act'). With respect to the above charge sheet, the appellant was called upon to face a Summary Court Martial. The appellant pleaded guilty to each of the charges in writing. After considering his defence, the Summary Court Martial proceedings were completed/concluded and the appellant was awarded with the punishment of reduction in rank, vide order dated 7.8.1999.

Thereafter the appellant was served with a show cause notice dated 24.3.2000, by which the appellant was called upon to show cause as to why he should not be discharged from Army service under the provisions of Section 20 of the Army Act, read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules, 1954. That the appellant replied to the said show cause notice on 10.4.2000. He denied the allegations made therein. According to the department, though the appellant pleaded guilty to the three charges, he denied those charges in the reply to the show cause notice dated 24.3.2000 and therefore the same were fraudulent in nature. According to the department, upon such denial, a Court of Inquiry came to be held in January, 2001 to ascertain the facts revealed by the appellant in the notice. According to the department, thereafter again meeting of the Court of Inquiry was held. The appellant appeared as a witness. He was examined. The Court of Inquiry put to him such questions as it thought desirable for testing the truth or accuracy of the statement made by him in his reply and for eliciting the truth. According to the department, the report of the Court of Inquiry was submitted to the authority concerned.

According to the department, the Court of Inquiry gave the finding that the appellant has given false and misleading reply in his say as well as in his evidence before the Court of Inquiry. According to the department, the appellant was, therefore, issued a show cause notice on 17.4.2001 to show cause as to why he should not be discharged from the Army under Rule 13(3) item III(V) as his services were no longer required, being undesirable.  That the appellant filed his reply to the said show cause notice on 14.6.2001. That thereafter the respondents terminated the appellant's services on 29.4.2002, in exercise of the powers under Section 20 of the Army Act, read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules.

 

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of termination dated 29.4.2002, the appellant preferred an appeal, which came to be rejected on 22.12.2003. That thereafter the appellant approached the High Court by way of present writ petition challenging the order of dismissal of the appellant as well as the order dismissing the appeal.

Before the High Court, it was the case on behalf of the appellant that once the appellant faced the Summary Court Martial and the appellant was awarded the punishment of reduction in rank, thereafter for the same charges, the appellant could not have been dismissed from service in exercise of powers under Section 20 of the Army Act, read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules. It was the case on behalf of the appellant that once the
Summary Court Martial awarded the punishment, thereafter to dismiss the appellant by passing an administrative order under Section 20 of the Army Act, read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules, would be double jeopardy, which is not permissible. However, the High Court did not agree with the same and dismissed the writ petition by observing that the administrative power under Section 20 of the Army Act, read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules, is an independent power and therefore the order of dismissal passed under Section 20 of the Army Act, read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules, is not required to be interfered with. Consequently, the High Court by the impugned judgment and order has dismissed the said writ petition and has refused to interfere with the administrative order dismissing the appellant from service, which was passed in exercise of the powers under Section 20 of the Army Act, read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, the appellant - original writ petitioner has preferred appeal in Supreme Court.

  

 

Observation of the Court and Conclusion of the Judgment

So far as the submission on behalf of the appellant that the order of dismissal passed under Section 20 of the Army Act would be violative of the principle of double jeopardy is concerned, for the reasons stated above, the same cannot be accepted. There is one another reason also why the order of dismissal under Section 20 of the Army Act cannot be said to be violative of the principle of double jeopardy. It is required to be noted that when earlier the appellant was treated by the Summary Court Martial, he was tried for the offences under Section 63 of the Army Act only. However, subsequently the Chief of the Army Staff was of the opinion that the particulars of charges for which earlier the appellant was tried by the Summary Court Martial and which were tried under Section 63 of the Army Act disclose that the offences were fraudulent in nature.

Therefore, while treating and considering the offences as fraudulent in nature and thereafter after giving an opportunity to the appellant as required under Rule 17 and thereafter having been satisfied that the appellant cannot be continued in service, the order of dismissal has been passed by respondent no.3 herein in exercise of powers under Section 20 of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules and the said order of dismissal has been confirmed by the Chief of the Army Staff while exercising the powers under Section 164 of the Army Act on a petition filed by the appellant. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of dismissal passed under Section 20 of the Army Act and confirmed by the Chief of the Army Staff cannot be said to be violative of the principle of double jeopardy.

Now so far as the submission on behalf of the department that subsequently the appellant was served with the show cause notice dated 17.04.2001 by which the appellant was called upon to show cause as to why he should not be discharged under Rule 13(3) item III(v) which was on the allegation that in reply dated 10.04.2000 to the show cause notice dated 24.03.2000, the appellant made a false and misleading reply and thereafter the Court of Enquiry was conducted and thereafter having found that the services of the appellant is no longer required being undesirable and therefore the order of discharge has been passed after following due procedure is concerned, it is required to be noted that the order of dismissal which is the subject matter of the present appeal has not been passed under Rule 13(3) item III(v). The order of dismissal in the present case is specifically passed under Section 20 of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules. Therefore, the justification of the order of dismissal which is the subject matter of the present appeal on the aforesaid ground is not sustainable. However, at the same time, and for the reasons stated above, order of dismissal dated 29.04.2002 which was the subject matter before the High Court and even before this Court which has been passed under Section 20 of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules is just, proper, legal and valid and the same is rightly not interfered by the High Court. We are in complete agreement with the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order.  

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